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Abstract
We study the role played by geographical distance in the peering decisions
between Internet Service Providers. Firstly, we assess whether or not the
Internet industry shows clustering in peering; we then concentrate on the
dynamics of the agglomeration process by studying the effects of bilateral
distance in changing the morphology of existing peering patterns.
Our results show a dominance of random spatial patterns in peering
agreements. The sign of the effect of distance on the peering decision, driving
the agglomeration/dispersion process, depends, however, on the initial level
of clustering. We show that clustered patterns will disperse in the long run.
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21 Introduction
The dramatic reduction in communication costs taking place in the last
decade induces a necessary reconsideration of both the notion and the role
played by geographical distance in the process of agglomeration of the
production activities. This is particularly true for digital goods, whose
transport costs converged to zero.
In this paper we study the different effects played by geographical
distance between providers within the Internet industry. We focus on the
interconnection decisions between operators participating at Internet
Exchange Points2 (IXP) in Europe. The agreements can be classified into two
main categories: peering and transit. Transit is a unilateral provider-to-
customer relationship, where the customer pays the provider in order to have
its traffic packets sent anywhere in the Internet; instead, peering is a bilateral
peer-to-peer relationship, where the networks exchange for free traffic
directed to their own customers.
Our objective is twofold. Firstly, we assess whether or not the IXP-based
Internet industry shows agglomeration in peering. Indeed, early studies show
the presence of some form of agglomeration, inherited by previously existing
industrial agglomeration for IT products. In order to do so we measure
clustering indexes for peering agreements realized by different operators.
These clustering measures depict however static configurations only, a
snapshot of spatial autocorrelation of the distribution of peering agreements
(we also provide maps of these snapshots as a visual tool to assess clustering).
 Our second objective focuses on the dynamics of the agglomeration process
by studying the role played by distance in the formation of a peering relation.
Indeed, the relationship between the industry structure and the
interconnection outcome is bi-directional: the network structure (clustering,
                                               
2 Internet Exchange Points are specialised organisations where ISPs can connect to exchange their
Internet traffic.
3dispersion, randomness in the distribution of peering agreements) affects the
role of geographical proximity on the formation of peering agreements,
which, in turn, once established will redesign  the network structure.
From a static point of view, our results consistently show the presence of
spatial random pattern in the peering agreements distributions studied, i.e. no
agglomeration. This result could be seen as an emergent equilibrium pattern
from an underlying network formation game3. Given this result, we next
assess the possibility for distance to still play a role in interconnection
decisions, and hence to have a dynamic effect on the agglomeration structure.
In particular, we do this by estimating a binary model for both the IXPs
displaying a random morphology and for the few exceptions showing on the
contrary, either a clustered or a dispersed spatial configuration of their
peering agreements.
Our analysis shows that the role of distance in affecting the probability of
bilateral peering between ISPs is different depending on whether we consider
an initially random ‘equilibrium’ pattern, a clustered or a dispersed one. In
the first and third cases the distance is consistently negatively related to
peering, suggesting the existence of localized positive externalities expressed
in the form of mutual knowledge and reputation effects. On the contrary, in
the case of a clustered pattern, the econometric analysis shows a positive
relationship between the geographical distance and the likelihood of peering.
We interpret this sign change as showing a dominant centrifugal force, the
prevalence of the positive effect of geographic differentiation, over the
centripetal one due to localized externalities. In the long run, presumably this
effect will lead to cluster breaking and the process will converge to the
dominant random pattern.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and
motivates the role of agglomeration in the Internet, while Section 3 provides
                                               
3 For a survey of this literature see D’Ignazio and Giovannetti (2006).
4an overview about the Internet structure and the interconnection agreements.
In Section 4 we analyze the morphology of peering within European IXPs;
Section 5 complements the results obtained in the previous section by
analyzing the determinants of bilateral peering decisions. Finally, section 5
concludes.
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Agglomeration in the Internet
In one of the earliest contributions of the renewed debate on the geographical
agglomeration of economic activity Krugman (1991) identified concentration
as ’the most striking feature of the geography of economic activity‘. More
recently Fujita and Thisse (2002) described agglomeration as the interplay
between two forces: localised positive externalities, which have a centripetal
effect, and transport costs, which act as centrifugal force.
Since Marshall (1920), agglomeration has been attributed to three forces: a
pooled labour market, greater provision of non-traded inputs, and knowledge
spillovers. Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Schleifer (1992) stressed the
importance of geographic proximity in defining the extent of knowledge
spillovers within firms of a given industry to explain the agglomeration in
cities. Following this approach proximity matters since a basic input for firms’
activities, tacit knowledge, is assumed to be only transferable through face to
face interaction: ’the transfer of information through modern transmission
devices requires its organization according to some pre-specified patterns,
and only formal information can be codified in this way‘ (Fujita and Thisse,
2002, p. 172).
This paper focuses on the analysis of the relevance of geography for the
Internet industry itself. Is there evidence of agglomeration in peering
decisions?  Is there any emerging equilibrium morphology?
5Previous studies showing some evidence of agglomeration in the
Internet are linked to both the Internet usage and previously existing
industrial agglomeration.  Forman et al. (2002) found that Internet usage and
access in the U.S. vary across regions and industries. Although Internet use is
widespread, not all industries adopt the Internet to enhance computing
processes in order to have a competitive advantage (e.g. electronic
commerce). Furthermore, rural and smaller urban areas often lag somewhat
behind.4 Isaksen (2004), and Power and Lundmark (2004) come to the
conclusion that there is evidence for industry clusters in ICT related branches.
To a certain degree, the location of such clusters may be explained by
previously existing industrial agglomerations that have a high demand for
ICT and related services. For example, financial services have a strong need
for fast and secure network connections, hence important network
infrastructure.
As we argued before, the static analysis of the Internet morphology
needs to be complemented by a dynamic study of the elements behind it. We
achieve this by studying the effects of proximity for strategic decisions by
Internet operators. Indeed, the Internet morphology is likely to affect
interconnection decisions, which, in turn, affect the morphology itself. The
key question hence becomes: does distance play a role in determining the
interconnection decisions?
The role of proximity and face-to-face contact becomes more important
as production processes become more fragmented and as firms have to rely
on incomplete contracts, thus highlighting the importance of mutual trust
(Spagnolo, 1999).  For example, Learner and Storper (2001) stress the
relevance of face-to-face relations for the establishment of trust. This is
particularly important for the Internet, where there is dominant asymmetric
                                               
4 This so called “digital divide” refers to the fact that Internet access and use is distributed unevenly
over social groups and geographic regions (see e.g. Warf, 2001).
6information involving the Operators performances and commitment. As
discussed below, in the peering decision between ISPs there are substantial
aspects of the transaction that are impossible to measure or monitor, so that
the peering decision may require substantial trust and informal cooperation
between peering partners. This may activate the centripetal force discussed
above: face-to-face meetings and social connections may facilitate the
governance of peering agreements, and the former may benefit from
geographical proximity.
It is important to notice, however, that the face-to-face interaction is not
the only, and not necessarily the best, way to transmit tacit knowledge or to
enforce exchanges. Interaction can instead be developing in places, not spaces,
whereby a place is a relational structure providing identification for the
individuals belonging to it, hence it is characterized by  ‘insiderness’ (Relph
1976, Place and Placeness from Dodge and Kitchin, 2000). A place, following
this view is not linked to a specific geographical location since the insiderness
of, for instance, an online community will in fact define its borders, through
affinity and cultural identification, dimensions, these, not often drawn in
geographic space, particularly so if the place considered lies in cyberspace.
To become a sustainable alternative to geographically defined districts,
the virtual ones will have to develop the ability to establish, maintain and
verify reputation and trust.   Hence the relevant issue in understanding the
possible emergence of virtual districts becomes: ‘do new technologies provide
the means for the emergence of conventions necessary to facilitate trust in
cyber mediated exchanges?’ Online places have been historically
characterized by behavioral codes also called netiquette, the breaking of
which has often disruptive consequences on the deviant’s reputation within
the community. If there is competition between geographical and virtual
districts, their relative competitive advantage will depend on whether the
monitoring of these codes is easier through geographical proximity or via
7online interaction, and on whether the ensuing necessity of a credible
retaliation of a deviant’s behavior is more easily implemented within an
online connected community or in a geographically clustered one
(Giovannetti, Neuhoff, Spagnolo 2006).  These elements taken together should
drive the agglomeration/polarization dynamics in the specific industry under
study, defining the shape and borders, if existing, of the geographical or
virtual distribution of the industry5.
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The Internet
The Internet is composed of many independent networks of very different
sizes, located around the globe, all directly or indirectly interconnected with
each other. This last feature guarantees the Internet’s most important
property: universal exchange of traffic between all end users (universal
connectivity). The industry is still mainly unregulated, and networks are left
completely free to decide where, how and with whom to interconnect.
Lacking a really dominant network, competitive forces and positive network
externalities have been sufficient until now to keep all the networks
interconnected.
Small Internet Service Providers (ISPs) rely on interconnections both
among themselves and to larger networks for the delivery of their customers’
data packets to their destinations outside the range of the ISP’s own
subscribers. The largest networks are called Backbones. These own or lease
national or international high-speed fiber optic networks and deliver packets
around the world for the many smaller networks connected to them.
                                               
5 The issue of the survival of geographical agglomeration when ICT becomes an efficient substitute of
face-to-face dealings has been addressed by Santarelli (2004). In a panel data analysis of the long term
evolution of Emilia Romagna’s industrial districts, he found that spatial concentration is no longer the
most crucial factor in agglomeration and the term “multi-located” district describes recent forms of
industrial agglomeration in a better way.
83.1 Interconnection Agreements
Two simple types of interconnection agreements have emerged to regulate
traffic at exchange points between networks: transit agreements and peering
agreements.  In a transit agreement, a large network – the transit provider -
offers access to the entire Internet to a smaller customer network against the
payment of a fee often related to the capacity of the connection link.
Under a peering agreement two networks exchange the traffic directed
to each other’s end users only. Peering can be seen as a reciprocal, non-
monetary exchange relationship that often implies various forms of
cooperation. Peering, when taking place privately, implies establishing direct
exchange points between the two networks, with the costs of creating and
maintaining the exchange points typically shared evenly. Peering agreements
may also take place at Internet Exchange Points (IXP), specialized facilities
and organizations where ISPs can connect to each other to exchange Internet
traffic. To peer at an IXP, an ISP usually has to establish a connection and pay
a membership fee, then it can use the circuit to exchange traffic with all other
members of the IXP willing to peer with it. This multiple peering possibility at
a single location makes peering at an IXP cheaper than establishing multiple
direct bilateral peering exchanges each requiring a single physical connection.
Being a member of an IXP also offers further advantages to an ISP: sharing of
information and a free mutual technical help forum, possible elements
towards forming insiderness of the virtual community of the Exchange
members. However, it is important to recall that, for an ISP, being a member
of an IXP does not imply also being able to peer with all other members.
Often, many ISPs are refused bilateral peering by other members of the same
Exchange.  This refusal to peer also implies that only a partial bilateral
connectivity structure takes place at an IXP. This is represented with a peering
matrix, displaying a value equal to one when two members peer and zero
when they do not.
9In the following we focus on the specific bilateral peering decisions
between ISPs at IXPs, trying to understand their main drivers and focussing
on the question of whether or not geographical proximity among the ISPs if
affecting their peering choices at the Internet Exchange Points.
3.2 The Peering Decision
Earlier work has identified several factors and problems that may affect
networks’ decision whether and with whom to peer. A first, rather obvious
factor is size. Peering requires establishing bilateral traffic exchange points, or
peering points, which entail fixed and variable technological costs. It follows
that a sufficiently intense traffic flow between the end users of the two
networks is a necessary precondition for peering to be economically viable.
The larger two networks are, the more intense will be the traffic between their
end users, and therefore networks’ size is necessarily a determinant of the
peering decision. In fact, almost all large backbone networks peer with each
other, the traffic being exchanged at several interconnection points
homogeneously distributed on the relevant geographical areas. Somewhat
smaller networks also peer with networks of comparable size, but typically
have to supplement their interconnection with transit agreements with
backbone networks. Since the costs of setting up and maintaining peering
points are usually shared equally by peering networks, unbalanced traffic
implies an unbalanced distribution of gains from peering against a balanced
distribution of costs. Such unbalanced situations have developed in some
cases, and have led to the discontinuation of the peering arrangement and to
its replacement with a transit one.  Finally when two networks are peering
and one of them is congested, the perceived speed of connection would not
improve were the non-congested network to upgrade its infrastructure. And
if the congested network chooses not to upgrade its infrastructure, it enjoys
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the full cost savings while it shares the reduced performance with all the
networks it is peering with. This problem may of course induce caution in
networks’ decision whether and with whom to peer.
3.3 Agglomeration in Peering?
Little is known about the potential effects of ISPs’ geographical location on
their peering decision, the focus of our empirical analysis. Should we expect
the geographical location of different ISPs to influence their peering decision?
Of course, if two ISPs are very far away building a connection from scratch
would be very costly; hence one would expect that very far ISPs would not
peer. However, consider a situation where there is an IXP where peering is
cheaper, and that there is a number of ISPs all of which are already connected
to this IXP. Should we then expect the geographical location of these ISPs to
matter in their choice of peering partners? Should agglomeration patterns be
observed in the peering decision?  The centrifugal force discussed before,
softening competition through local differentiation, would not be active in
this case, since the decision to peer at the IXP is independent from the location
choice of the ISPs with respect to end users.
Some centripetal forces considered in the literature, such as knowledge
spillovers obtained through interactions with peers, may be moderately
active; while transport costs do not matter here since we consider a
population of ISPs that are already connected to a given IXP and their only
decision is whether or not to switch on an interface at an IXP were they are
already located. As discussed above, many features of a peering agreement
are not directly monitorable, not to say verifiable/contractible. Hence peering
agreements may require a great deal of trust and informal cooperation, in
which case face-to-face can be important.
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4 Clustering in the European Internet
In this section we analyze the strength of agglomerating forces on the peering
decision in Europe. In particular, for each European IXP we study the
distribution of the number of peering agreements signed by its members. The
analysis, which involves the estimation of spatial autocorrelation indexes, is
complemented with a series of maps.
4.1 Spatial Autocorrelation and the Moran’s I Index
The Moran's I index (Moran, 1848) is often used to test the hypothesis of no-
clustering for spatially distributed variables. This index, actually measuring
spatial autocorrelation, is calculated by taking into account the value assumed
by the variable under analysis at different locations. In particular, let N denote
the total number of observations, let 
iz   be the value that the variable takes at
location i, let µ  be its average and let 
ijw  
be elements of a spatial weights
matrix. Then the  Moran’s index is given by
( ) ( )( ) ( )∑∑∑ −−−=
j
i
j
jiij
i
xxxwSNI
2
0 µµµ
where 0S  is a normalizing factor given by  ∑∑=
j
ij
i
wS0
The  inference is based upon the analysis of the standardized z-value*
of the Moran’s index: this is obtained by subtracting its expected value under
the hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation (in this case the expectation of I is
( )11 −N , see Upton and Fingleton6 (1985) and Anselin (1992)) from the I
statistic and dividing the result by the observed standard deviation. The z
statistic is employed to test the hypothesis of no spatial correlation. Moreover
the z  test also indicates the sign of the geographical clustering, if any, (a
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positive value for the z statistic suggests positive spatial autocorrelation -
clustered outcome - while a negative value for the z statistic suggests a
dispersed one).
The following table 1, reports the spatial autocorrelation statistics
(Observed Moran’s index, Theoretical Moran’s index under the hypothesis of
no spatial autocorrelation, Variance and Standardised Moran’s index) for each
of the IXP members of the European Internet Exchange Association (Euro-IX,
http://www.euro-ix.net/). Table 1 shows a very strong regularity across
IXPs: the variable “number of peering agreements for each ISP” indeed
follows almost everywhere a random geographical distribution. This, result
can be interpreted as an   equilibrium morphology. A noticeable exception is
represented by the case of Vienna Internet eXchange (VIX), whose
distribution results strongly clustered. Other exceptions are represented by
the cases of España Internet Exchange (ESPANIX) and Romanian Network for
Internet eXchange (RONIX), both showing some degree of dispersion.
                                                                                                                                      
6 We would like ti thank Dr Fingleton for helpful suggestions on this topic.
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Table 1: Spatial autocorrelation statistics for peering agreements within the
Euro-IX Members
IXP Moran’s
 I index
Location
Theoretical I index under
the hypothesis of no spatial
autocorrelation
Variance z-value Outcome
AIX -0.0912 Athens, Greece -0.07692 0.01087 -0.1369 random
AMS-IX* -0.008Amsterdam, Netherlands -0.00625 0.00012 -0.1569 random
BIX -0.0306 Budapest, Hungary -0.02222 0.00147 -0.2196 random
BCIX -0.0564 Berlin, Germany -0.07143 0.00501 0.21302 random
BNIX -0.0425 Brussels, Belgium -0.02632 0.00209 -0.3553 random
CATNIX -0.1197 Barcelona, Spain -0.09091 0.01248 -0.2579 random
CIXP -0.1005 Geneva, Switzerland -0.05556 0.00971 -0.4559 random
DE-CIX* -0.007 Frankfurt, Germany -0.00794 0.00022 0.06605 random
ESPANIX -0.1777 Madrid, Spain -0.04 0.00485 -1.9773 dispersed
FICIX -0.0673 Helsinki, Finland -0.07692 0.02584 0.05993 random
GIGAPIX 0.01981 Lisbon, Portugal -0.07143 0.01928 0.65701 random
GN-IX -0.1898 Groningen, Netherlands -0.125 0.03914 -0.3274 random
INEX -0.0681 Dublin, Ireland -0.2 0.06038 0.53685 random
LIPEX -0.0626 London, UK -0.025 0.00108 -1.1438 random
LIX -0.1216 Luxembourg -0.11111 0.01544 -0.0847 random
LINX* 0.00556 London, UK -0.0068 0.00019 0.89601 random
LONAP -0.0251 London, UK -0.02857 0.00163 0.08683 random
MADIX -0.2096 Manchester, UK -0.25 0.08067 0.14229 random
MIX 0.01394 Milan, Italy -0.01754 0.00087 1.06691 random
MSK-IX -0.0202 Moscow, Russia -0.00952 0.00025 -0.6725 random
NAMEX -0.1527 Rome, Italy -0.07692 0.00816 -0.839 random
NDIX -0.1956 Enschede, Netherlands -0.25 0.03283 0.30044 random
NETNOD -0.043 Stockholm, Sweden -0.02326 0.00138 -0.5323 random
NIX-CZ -0.0292 Prague, Czech Republic -0.02857 0.00253 -0.0131 random
NIX -0.0329 Oslo, Norway -0.02439 0.00154 -0.2162 random
PARIX -0.0136 Paris, France -0.03448 0.00762 0.23892 random
RONIX -0.22 Bucharest, Romania -0.05 0.00881 -1.8113 dispersed
TIX -0.0267 Zurich, Switzerland -0.02222 0.00157 -0.1141 random
TOPIX -0.077 Torino, Italy -0.09091 0.00894 0.1466 random
VIX 0.07147 Vienna, Austria -0.01389 0.00061 3.45367 clustered
XCHANGEPOINT -0.0407 London, UK -0.01266 0.00053 -1.2253 random
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In the following we focus on a subset of IXPs. Among those
characterized by a random pattern of peering agreements, we selected three
particularly relevant IXPs looking at both their geographical location and the
number of participants for each: they are the London Internet Exchange Point
(LINX), the Amsterdam Internet Exchange (AMS-IX), and the Deutsche
Commercial Internet Exchange (DE-CIX), located in Frankfurt. We also focus
on the few IXPs that exhibit ‘non equilibrium’ spatial distribution in peering:
these are the VIX (Vienna), showing a clustered pattern of agreements, and
the ESPANIX (Madrid) and the RONIX (Bucharest), displaying, on the
contrary a dispersed peering morphology. For these IXPs we provide the
relevant map of peering agreements distributions.
AMSIX is one of the largest IXPs in Europe with its 225 members. Figure
1 below synthesizes the characteristics of AMSIX members (geographical
position and number of peering agreements reached) and the features of the
AMSIX peering matrix. Each ISP is represented by a bar, geographically
positioned at the location of its headquarter, whose height directly depends
upon the number of peering agreements signed by that ISP.
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Figure 1: Peering geographical distribution at the AMS-IX (random)
No clustering characterizes the number of peering agreements reached; in
fact, the heights of the bars seem to be random and not depending upon the
geographical position within the area of interest. This conclusion is also
supported by the standardized Moran’s ‘I’ statistic of spatial autocorrelation7
of –0.157 (see Table 1 above). There is thus strong evidence in support of the
claim that the distribution of peering agreements follows a random
geographical pattern.
With 182 and 165 members respectively, both LINX and DE-CIX are
among the largest IXPs in Europe, with the LINX also being the largest in
terms of Internet traffic exchanged. As for the AMS-IX, also at both LINX and
DE-CIX the geographical distribution of peering agreements seems not to be
influenced by geographical location of the ISPs. The randomness
characterizing the geographical distribution of peering agreements is
supported also by the standardized Moran’s Index, given by 0.89 and -0.066,
respectively.
A very different pattern characterizes the VIX, (the main Austria’s IXP,
having 87 members) resulting in a clustered structure, and both the EXPANIX
(28 members) and the RONIX, (25 members) both having a dispersed
structure.
                                               
7 As described in paragraph 4.1, the significance of spatial autocorrelation is tested through a z-test on
the standardised values of the Moran’s I Index. The sign of the standardised coefficient also indicates
the direction of the autocorrelation (dispersed, if negative, and clustered, if positive).
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Figure 2: Peering geographical distribution at the VIX (clustered)
Figure 3: Peering geographical distribution at the ESPANIX (dispersed)
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5 An econometric analysis of the role of proximity effects
on peering
In the previous section we showed that the European peering within IXPs
consistently follow a random distribution, characterising 27 IXPs over a total
of 31. The randomness in the peering agreements distribution can be
interpreted as an equilibrium state, where no agglomeration occurs, with the
only exception given by the VIX (clustered) and the ESPANIX and RONIX
(dispersed). In this section we extend the analysis to study whether or not the
geographical proximity still plays a role in explaining bilateral peering
choices. We differentiate between IXPs in the equilibrium state (again, we
focus on AMSIX, DE-CIX and LINX) from IXPs out of the equilibrium state
(VIX, ESPANIX and RONIX). This analysis is relevant also from a dynamic
point of view. If a clear relationship between proximity and peering decisions
exists, then the relationship between the morphology and the peering
decisions becomes bilateral: the morphology affects the interconnection
decision, which, in turn, affects the morphology.
The pictures below represent the actual peering interconnection within
LINX and DE-CIX: the providers are again represented by bars whose height
depends on the number of peering agreements signed. The peers are joined by
a line.
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Figure 4: Peering geographical distribution at the LINX
Figure 5: Peering geographical distribution at the DE-CIX
Four possible configurations may emerge from joint consideration of the IXP
clustering and their dynamic agglomeration through bilateral; peering
choices:
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1. An IXP is clustered and distance has negative sign on peering then we can
say that yes, the econometric analysis confirms that it is more likely to
observe a clustered structure since further away ISPs do not tend to peer.
2. An IXP is clustered and distance has positive sign we can say that since the
distributions of peering agreements per locality/headquarters is
concentrated around a locality, headquarter distance has a positive added
value for bilateral peering.
3. An IXP has spatially dispersed peering agreements and the sign of
distance is negative, implies that while headquarters prefer localised
peering agreements probably these are among neighbouring ISPs, so these
may be scattered in peering groups.
4. Finally an IXP has spatially dispersed peering agreements and the sign for
the distance in the regression is positive, this shows an industry where
activity is dispersed but connected through valuable peering links across
long distance
Each of these 4 possibilities might suggest a graph representation: connected
dispersed clusters, unconnected dispersed clusters connected clustered
clusters, unconnected connected clusters.
5.1 Empirical Specification of the Probit Model
We now explore these possible scenarios by specifying a binary probit model.
The dependent variable, the peering decision, is obtained from the IXP
peering matrix, showing, in correspondence of each pair or providers, if either
they are in a peering relationship (peering=1) or not (peering=0).
We introduce several independent variables to explain the peering
decision. The influence of the geographic location on the peering decision,
involving each pair of providers, is modeled by the geographic distance
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between them8. Moreover for each Internet provider we derived the set of
Euro-IX members at which it participates; this information was used to devise
a second set of variables. Firstly, the possibility of reputation effects in peering
decisions (Titley, 1997) and the technical element of the hot potato routing are
expressed by a variable indicating, for each pair of providers, how many IXPs
they are both members of9. Secondly, we introduce a variable to model the
asymmetry in the providers’ size by considering the difference in the number
of Euro-IX IXPs memberships every ISP has
Finally, a variable to model traffic imbalances is devised. Although
traffic flows are kept confidential, it is possible to determine a proxy for traffic
imbalances by looking at the publicly available Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) routing tables10. In particular, we calculated the following measure of
betweenness centrality (Shimbel, 1953) for each Internet operator v:
( ) ( )∑
∈≠≠
=
Vtvs
sts vvB σ
where  ( ) ( )vv tsst σσ =  is the number of shortest BGP paths from the Internet
Operator s to the Operator t on which the v lies on. High betweenness for v
indicates that presumably a relevant quantity of traffic flows among that
node.
                                               
8 We followed a two stage process to calculate the distance: we first individuated latitude and longitude
for each ISP’s headquarter, then we used the “Great Circle Distance Formula using decimal degrees”  to
calculate the distance between any couple of headquarters. The formula is given by dist(P1, P2) = 3963.0
* arccos[sin(lat1/57.2958) * sin(lat2/57.2958) + cos(lat1/57.2958) * cos(lat2/57.2958) *  cos(lon2/57.2958 -
lon1/57.2958)]
9 In order to obtain the relevant variables from the initial set of data, given by the peering matrixes for
the Euro-IX members, we created several visual basic routines.
10 The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a series of “instructions” that govern the transmission of
packets over the Internet. The BGP establishes the paths that data packets will take through connected
networks. The BGP is itself data, and by design nearly always take the same paths; this method (in-band
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Table 2: Probit Regression Model Variables
dependent variable
PEERING (dummy)
Assumes value 1 in case of peering between providers, 0
otherwise.
independent variables
DIST ISPS distance between each couple of ISPs (in thousands of miles)
COMMON_IXPS number of European IXPs in which the ISPs are both present
DIFF_IXP_MEMBER difference in the number of memberships in European IXPs
DIFF_RELEVANCE
difference in the betweenness value (in hundreds thousands of
units)
                                                                                                                                      
transmission) avoids the introduction of new false positive routing information: a non-existent link can
not be traversed by routing data (Woodcock, 2002).
22
The Probit Model
Let y be a binary variable, x  be a )1( K×  vector of explanatory variables and Ã  be a
)1( ×K vector of unknown parameters. The probit model is derived from the following
underlying latent variable model:
ey += xÃ* ,   [ ]01 * >= yy
where e has a standard normal distribution1 and is independent of the explanatory
variables x . Let Φ  be its cumulative density function (cdf); then, it can be shown that
( ) ( ) ( )xÃxx Φ=== pyP |1
We are interested in the effect of the explanatory variable kx  on the above response
probability. In such a model, this effect is not entirely determined by jβ : it also
depends on the values assumed by the explanatory variables x . In particular, if jx is
continuous,
( ) ( ) j
jx
p βφ xÃx =
∂
∂
where ( ) ( )z
dz
d
z
Φ
=φ  is the standard normal density function. Instead, if  kx  is
discrete the partial effect of kx going from kc to 1+kc is given by
( )[ ] [ ]kkkkkkkk cxcx ββββββ +++Φ−++++Φ −−−− 111111 ...1...
Hence, the partial effect of jx on ( )xp depends on x  through ( )xÃφ . However, since
Φ  is a strictly increasing cdf, the sign of the partial effect is determined by the sign of
jβ . It is worth to notice, finally, that since the latent variable does not have a unit of
measurement, the magnitude of the jβ  are not meaningful.
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5.2 Estimation Results
In the following we introduce the probit model estimation results for AMS-IX,
LINX, DE-CIX, VIX, ESPANIX and RONIX.
Table 3: Probit Estimated Model Results
AMS-IX DE-CIX LINX VIX ESPANIX RONIX
DIST ISPS -.043 -.041 -.009 .055 .078 -.115
(10.23) (2.78) (1.90) (3.77) (1.46) (1.11)
COMMON_IXP .454 .338 .394 .215 .326 -
(30.59) (20.83) (26.27) (6.46) (2.98) -
DIFF_IXP_MEMBER -.022 -.024 .011 -.065 -.021 .034
(6.23) (5.24) (2.62) (7.80) (1.00) (1.39)
DIFF_RELEVANCE -.016 -.016 -.014 -.247 -.347 1.308
(22.32) (18.15) (17.76) (10.36) (3.25) (3.99)
CONSTANT .296 .337 .144 .578 .122 -1.25
(19.18) (16.44) (7.11) (10.92) (0.53) (5.16)
Observations 18145 9591 12880 2415 210 153
Pseudo R-Square 0.0681 0.0579 0.0583 0.0869 0.1053 0.1225
Log-likelihood -11538.3 -6009.1 -8214.43 -1314.20 -118.31 -66.45
Significance test
statistic: LR chi2(6)
1685.40 738.82 1017.30 250.17 27.85 18.54
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
 UDQGRPSHHULQJGLVWULEXWLRQ FOXVWHUHGSHHULQJGLVWULEXWLRQ GLVSHUVHGSHHULQJGLVWULEXWLRQ
The above table shows that three variables seem to consistently affect
peering decision between a pair of providers. These are the hot potato and
reputation effect, expressed by the number of IXPs that they are both member
of, having a positive effect, and the difference in both size and traffic flows,
respectively modeled through difference in the number of memberships at the
Euro-IX IXPs and the difference in traffic flows (captured through the
betweenness).
One of our most interesting findings is that the geographical distance
seems to play a role that depends on the nature of the IXP morphology.
Indeed, if we consider IXPs exhibiting a random pattern about the peering
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agreement distribution (AMSIX, DECIX, LINX), the distance seems to have a
negative effect on peering. The significance level is very high for both AMSIX
and DECIX, while lower for LINX. This result also matches the result of the
Moran’s z value for LINX being much higher than those characterizing both
AMSIX and DECIX.
While turning on the VIX, characterized by a clustered distribution, the
geographical distance is still significant but with positive sign. Distance plays
the opposite role on the likelihood of establishing bilateral peering
agreements depending on the existing degree of clustering of the IXP. Finally,
IXPs characterized by dispersed patterns of the peering agreements
distributions distance does not seem to play a role.
The table below provides the partial effects calculated in correspondence of
the mean values vector of the explanatory variables.
Table 4: Probit Estimated Partial Effects
Variable dy/dx AMS-IX
 DE-CIX LINX VIX ESPANIX RONIX
DIST ISPS -.017 -.015 -.004 .018 .027 -.029
(10.23) (2.78) (1.90) (3.77) (1.46) (1.12)
COMMON_IXP .177 .128 .152 .071 .111 -
(30.75) (20.97) (26.48) (6.48) (3.16) -
DIFF_IXP_MEMBER -.009 -.009 .004 -.021 -.007 .008
(6.23) (5.24) (2.62) (7.82) (1.00) (1.40)
DIFF_RELEVANCE -.006 -.006 -.005 -.081 -.119 .332
(22.30) (18.12) (17.77) (10.30) (3.23) (3.94)
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
 UDQGRPSHHULQJGLVWULEXWLRQ FOXVWHUHGSHHULQJGLVWULEXWLRQ GLVSHUVHGSHHULQJGLVWULEXWLRQ
From a dynamic point of view, the results obtained are very interesting. By
combining the results obtained in section 4 and section 5 it comes out that the
European peering morphology at IXPs is converging through the randomness
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equilibrium distribution. Indeed, the positive role played by the distance in
peering within clustered IXPs is likely to be cluster breaking in the long run.
6
 
Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the relevance of geography for the Internet
Industry by analyzing the peering decisions between Internet Service
Providers participating at different European Internet Exchange Points.
Firstly we focused on a static analysis, providing the picture of the emerging
morphology in peering. In particular we computed spatial autocorrelation
statistics for the number of peering agreements realized within the different
IXPs. Results showed a dominant presence of random pattern, suggesting a
non-agglomerated equilibrium. This result is in line with the effects of the
‘death of distance’.
We then investigated the possibility that distance still plays a role in
the strategic interconnection decisions between providers. Indeed, the
possibility of mutual control is argued to be important for the governance of
relationships, such peering, characterized by highly asymmetric information.
Interestingly, geographical distance is significant in explaining peering within
the equilibrium ‘random’ IXPs and the IXPs resulting instead clustered.
However, it seems to play a very different role depending on the pre-existing
morphology. Within IXPs characterized by a random morphology,
geographical distance has a negative effect on peering: this may indicate
relevance for mutual knowledge and face-to-face contact in peering decisions.
When considering clustered IXPs, instead, the likelihood of peering seems to
increase with the distance within the providers. From a dynamic point of
view, this effect is likely to be cluster breaking in the long run, with the
clustered morphology converging to the random equilibrium.
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Other interesting results in the analysis of bilateral peering show
consistently, across both random, clustered and dispersed morphologies, that
hot potato and reputation effects positively affect peering, while difference in
both size and traffic flows has a negative effect.
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